BTH News: A $6.3 Billion Job Interview, AI Hijacking, and More

November 5, 2026

Welcome back to Between The Hacks News, where we look beyond the headlines to understand what happened, why it matters, and what we can learn from it.

This week, we have a job interview that helped open the door to a multibillion-dollar cryptocurrency theft, attackers running up enormous bills using stolen AI credentials, cyberattacks against European refrigeration systems, compromised websites targeting mobile phones, and devices at the White House apparently renting out their Internet connections to strangers.

Five very different stories. One recurring problem: technology we trust can become a pathway for attackers.

Let's get into it.

1. A Job Interview That Cost $6.3 Billion

In September, a Binance engineer received a job offer through a legitimate recruiting platform.

The recruiter looked real. So did the company.

The first interview was with someone claiming to work in HR. It happened over live video. The interviewer shared social media profiles, photos, and enough personal detail to make the conversation feel credible.

The second interview was with the supposed CEO.

Then came the take-home coding assignment.

That is a fairly normal hiring process. The minor problem was that the company did not exist.

According to Binance's November 3 report, the assignment contained malware. The engineer downloaded it onto a work laptop, giving the attackers a foothold inside the company.

This started earlier

The September interview was not the beginning of the entire intrusion.

In June, another engineer had downloaded a tampered installer while searching for an AI coding tool. Binance detected suspicious activity, replaced the laptop, and rotated credentials. But the attackers had already learned who worked on the wallet team and how people inside Binance were connected.

That knowledge made the later recruiter approach far more convincing.

By October 20, Binance says the attackers were using the company's own internal AI tool to reach two more engineers. One of those computers held credentials that opened another door.

On October 29, the attackers used that access to reach Binance's wallet infrastructure.

According to Binance, approximately $6.34 billion in digital assets was moved during the incident.

Four months of preparation. Several compromised computers. One very expensive take-home assignment.

Binance says approximately $2.85 billion was frozen or intercepted. The company has also committed to covering the losses with its own funds.

Why this matters

I've written about North Korean operatives posing as job applicants before.

In The Spy Who Applied to Code, I covered an attempt to infiltrate cryptocurrency exchange Kraken through a fraudulent job application.

In Your Next Cyberattack Could Start with a Job Application, I explored why recruiting has become part of the corporate security perimeter.

This time, the attacker sat on the other side of the interview.

There is nothing unusual about an employee exploring another job. The danger begins when an outside organization asks that employee to download and run unfamiliar code on a corporate computer.

For employees, the lesson is simple. Keep interview assignments off work devices. Verify the company and the people involved. If you must run unfamiliar code, use an isolated environment.

For employers, assume a convincing recruiter can be part of an intrusion. Limit what developer workstations can reach. Protect credentials. Monitor internal tools, including AI systems, for unusual access.

The Binance incident was not caused by one bad click. It was a chain of small openings that eventually reached the systems that mattered.

That is usually how the expensive ones work.

Sources: Binance's November 3 incident report, Reuters, BleepingComputer.

2. Hackers Are Stealing AI Access and Leaving Companies With the Bill

Remember cryptojacking?

Attackers compromised computers and used their processing power to mine cryptocurrency. The victim paid for the electricity and computing resources while the attacker collected the proceeds.

Now there's an AI variation.

It's called LLMjacking.

Instead of stealing computing power to mine cryptocurrency, attackers steal access to cloud-based AI models and use those resources without authorization.

And the bills can be enormous.

On November 2, Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant published research describing multiple LLMjacking incidents investigated during 2026.

In some cases, unauthorized AI consumption generated more than $100,000 in charges in a single day.

At some organizations, cumulative fraudulent charges reached $1 million before access was revoked.

That's a fairly expensive way to discover your API credentials have been stolen.

How does this happen?

Organizations increasingly integrate large language models into their applications and business processes.

Those integrations often use API keys, service accounts, and cloud credentials to authenticate requests.

If attackers obtain those credentials, they may be able to use the organization's AI services as though they were authorized customers.

Depending on the permissions and configuration, attackers can consume large volumes of tokens, invoke expensive models, or resell unauthorized access.

The legitimate organization receives the bill.

Google's research describes incidents across several industries, including financial services, retail, technology, and transportation.

Why this matters

We've spent years teaching organizations to protect passwords, authentication tokens, and cloud credentials.

AI doesn't change that requirement.

It adds another reason to take it seriously.

An AI API key isn't just a technical credential. It may provide access to a service that can accumulate substantial charges very quickly.

And the risk isn't limited to billing.

Depending on the integration, a compromised credential might also expose data, application capabilities, or other resources.

Organizations should treat AI credentials like other privileged secrets.

Store them securely. Limit their permissions. Rotate them when compromised. Monitor usage patterns and investigate unexpected spikes.

Set budgets and alerts, but don't assume a budget alert automatically prevents further consumption.

And avoid embedding privileged API keys in applications or repositories where unauthorized users can retrieve them.

There's also a governance lesson.

If you don't know which teams are using AI services, which models they're accessing, or how those services are authenticated, you may have an inventory problem before you have a security problem.

Sound familiar?

Source: Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant: The Rise of LLMJacking.

3. European Refrigeration Attacks Spread Beyond Supermarkets

A few weeks ago, I wrote about hackers manipulating refrigeration equipment at French supermarkets.

Temperatures reportedly reached 50°C (122°F), spoiling food and forcing retailers to discard products.

My article, The French Fridge Failure, focused on the dangers of exposing management interfaces for physical equipment to the Internet.

Unfortunately, the story didn't end in France.

On November 2, supermarkets in several European countries reported similar attacks affecting refrigeration and freezer systems.

Retailers in Sweden, Belgium, and Luxembourg were among those reporting incidents.

At one Swedish supermarket, freezers reportedly reached 50°C.

That's 122°F.

Not exactly ideal ice cream storage conditions.

The attacks disrupted operations and forced retailers to discard food.

Then the story took a more concerning turn.

From frozen food to blood storage

On November 4, French authorities disclosed that cyberattacks had affected refrigeration monitoring and control systems at three regional facilities associated with the French Blood Establishment.

The good news is that the blood supply was reportedly not affected.

Staff received alerts and moved blood products to refrigeration units that weren't connected to the compromised systems.

That response is worth emphasizing.

The organization had a way to detect the problem and protect the products despite the disruption.

Authorities are still investigating the technical details, and the available evidence doesn't establish that all the refrigeration incidents involved the same attackers or vulnerabilities.

The concern is not limited to Europe.

The Pentagon is also investigating refrigeration failures that spoiled food at at least six U.S. military commissaries in August. Investigators are treating the incidents as possible cyberattacks, although they have not publicly confirmed the cause or connected them to the European activity.

Different continent. Uncomfortably similar symptoms.

Why this matters

This is why I keep emphasizing the difference between Internet-connected and Internet-accessible.

A refrigeration controller may legitimately need to communicate with a remote monitoring service.

That doesn't mean its administrative interface should be reachable by anyone on the Internet.

Remote connectivity can provide enormous operational benefits.

But connectivity must be designed around appropriate authentication, access restrictions, monitoring, and separation of critical functions.

The blood-storage incident also illustrates the importance of resilience.

Security isn't only about preventing attackers from reaching a system.

It's about limiting the consequences when something goes wrong.

Independent temperature monitoring, local alarms, and procedures for transferring sensitive products can make the difference between a serious incident and a much larger emergency.

A firewall is useful.

A backup plan is useful too.

Preferably, you have both.

Sources: Reuters, November 2, Reuters, November 4, Defense News.

4. Your Phone Could Be Attacked Just by Visiting a Website

Most people understand that downloading suspicious applications or clicking unfamiliar links can be dangerous.

But what if you visit a legitimate website and the website itself has been compromised?

That's the scenario described in new research from French cybersecurity company Sekoia.

On November 4, researchers disclosed a campaign they call Poisoned Source, which they linked to the Russia-associated threat actor APT29.

The attackers used compromised websites, deceptive domains, and a compromised web analytics component to deliver malicious JavaScript.

The code collected information about visitors' browsers and mobile devices.

Depending on the device and software version, the attack infrastructure could deliver an exploit chain targeting iOS or Android.

Some of those exploits required no additional user interaction after the affected page loaded.

No suspicious attachment.

No application installation.

Just visiting a compromised website with a vulnerable device.

But there's an important detail

The campaign used vulnerabilities for which patches were already available.

Security researchers sometimes call these N-day vulnerabilities, meaning the weaknesses were already known rather than previously undisclosed zero-days.

That distinction matters.

It means devices running current, patched software may already have protection against the specific exploit chains researchers identified.

The attackers targeted particular combinations of browser and operating-system versions, not every iPhone or Android device.

The reported payloads could collect sensitive information, including browser cookies and, under some conditions, additional device data.

Stolen session cookies can be particularly valuable because they may allow attackers to impersonate authenticated users without knowing their passwords.

Why this matters

This is a good reminder that a legitimate website isn't automatically a safe website.

Attackers don't always need to convince you to visit a malicious domain.

Sometimes they compromise a website you already trust or a third-party component that website loads.

For individuals, the most important defense is keeping your phone and browser updated.

For organizations, mobile device management, security monitoring, and policies governing access to sensitive systems can help reduce exposure.

And for website operators, third-party scripts deserve scrutiny.

An analytics script may seem harmless, but code delivered through that script runs in visitors' browsers.

That's a meaningful trust relationship.

The broader lesson is familiar.

Software updates matter, even when there isn't a dramatic headline telling you to install them.

Sources: Sekoia research coverage, The Hacker News, Help Net Security.

5. The White House May Be Renting Out Its Internet Address

Residential proxy networks let customers route their Internet traffic through someone else's connection.

That can make the customer's activity appear to come from an ordinary home, business, or mobile device instead of a data center or known VPN.

According to research reported by KrebsOnSecurity, several Internet addresses associated with the White House appeared as exit points for residential proxy services.

In plain English, strangers may have been able to rent an Internet connection that looked like it came from the White House.

That is not the sort of side hustle anyone wants on a government network.

How does this happen?

Residential proxy software can arrive through malware, but it may also be bundled into an application or software component. A user installs something that appears useful or harmless. Somewhere in the process, the device becomes part of a commercial proxy network.

The owner may receive nothing. The proxy operator receives a network connection it can sell.

Researchers at Parallax observed the White House-associated proxy activity between October 5 and November 3. Other proxy-detection services reportedly identified the same addresses as residential proxy exits.

The researchers did not identify the devices or people involved. They also did not establish that classified systems were compromised. The activity could involve staff devices, personal phones, or another system using the network.

That uncertainty matters.

But so does the activity.

From Internet weapon to rented identity

I've written about IoT botnets for years.

In Attack of the Light Bulbs, I explained how compromised cameras, routers, and other connected devices can be combined into an Internet weapon. More recently, in Unlimited Access: Every Device on Your Network Can Talk to the Internet, I focused on the visibility problem. Most of us do not know where our devices are connecting or what they are doing in the background.

This is the next version of that problem.

Traditional IoT botnets turned devices into weapons. Residential proxy networks turn them into rented identities.

The device's processing power may not be the valuable part. Its trusted Internet address is.

Why this matters

Traffic leaving a White House address carries a very different reputation and risk than traffic leaving an obvious hosting provider.

Unknown customers could use that address for scraping, account abuse, fraud, reconnaissance, or other activity. Poorly secured proxy software may also create opportunities to reach resources that should never be exposed to the proxy customer.

For organizations, blocking known malicious destinations is not enough. Security teams need visibility into outbound connections, installed applications, browser extensions, mobile software, and devices that quietly join external networks.

For individuals, be suspicious of free applications that promise rewards for sharing bandwidth. Review installed software and permissions. Keep routers and connected devices updated. Separate less-trusted devices from computers and systems that matter.

Your Internet connection has value.

If you are not paying for the product, you may be the product. And apparently, your IP address may be available by the hour.

Sources: KrebsOnSecurity, Parallax.

Final Thoughts

This week's stories illustrate how cybersecurity risks emerge from ordinary activities.

A software engineer interviews for a job.

A company integrates AI into its applications.

A supermarket remotely monitors its refrigeration equipment.

Someone visits a familiar website on their phone.

Someone installs an ordinary-looking app or connects a device without knowing it has joined a proxy network.

None of those activities is inherently suspicious.

The risk appears when an attacker finds a way to exploit the trust or access involved.

And that's why security can't be reduced to a checklist of vulnerabilities.

We need to understand how people use technology, how systems communicate, what privileges they have, and what happens when something fails.

The Binance attack is particularly interesting because it combined several weaknesses over months. The attackers didn't need every defense to fail simultaneously. They needed enough opportunities to eventually reach the systems that mattered.

The refrigeration incidents remind us that cybersecurity can have physical consequences.

LLMjacking shows that stolen credentials can now produce substantial financial losses without stealing traditional financial information.

And the mobile attacks demonstrate why keeping software updated remains one of the simplest and most important security practices.

The White House proxy activity shows that a compromised device can lend attackers something beyond computing power: the trust attached to its Internet address.

Different attacks. Different technologies.

Many of the same fundamental lessons.

Until next time, stay curious, stay informed, and stay secure.

Between The Hacks